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REWARD TO PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC POLICY;

THE COMMON LAW RULE.

EXCEPTION TO

The general rule of common law that

it is against public policy to permit a public official to recover a re-

ward for doing any act which he should have done in the ordinary
course of his duty is well known. Originating in England-Bidge
v. Cage, Cro. Jac. io 3 (1654)-it has been repeatedly affirmed in
this country: In Re Russell, 5z Conn. 577 (1884); Pool v.
Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219 (i849) ; Pilie v. Nlew Orleans, 19
La. Ann. 274 (x867).

A case which involved this doctrine was decided in the Supreme
Court of the United States in March, 1899. In Matthews v.. The
United States, 173 U. S. 381, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413, certain circumstances were present which, in the minds of the majority of the
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court, removed the case from the general rule of the common law
above mentioned, and necessitated the establishment of certain
exceptions to it.
Matthews v. The United States arose in the Court of Claims (32
Ct. Cl. 123). The two plaintiffs were, one a regular, and the
other a specially appointed deputy marshal. The Sundry Civil
Appropriation Act of z891 had appropriated money for the prosecution of crimes against the United States. The present plaintiffs
claimed a reward offered under this act by the Attoriiey-General
of thc United States for the arrest and conviction of a man who
had murdered a revenue officer in Florida. Their efforts resulted
in the arrest and conviction of the criminal. Payment of the r-vard
was refused by the Attorney-General and this action was brought in
the Court of Claims. That court found for the plaintiffs mainly on
two gronnds: (x) that as a deputy is employed an4 paid by the
marshal and not directly by the United States, he is not such an
officer of the United States as is by law prohibited from receiving
any reward beyond his salary; (2) that "a deputy is not an officer
upon whom, as such, the law places any official duty," nor is he
"the prescribed official agency of the Government for making
arrests, like a constable or police officer."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the United States relied for
Teversal solely on two propositions: x. That as at common law it
was against public policy to allow an officer to receive a reward for
doing his legal duty, therefore the statute under which the AttorneyGeneral acted, and the offer made by him should be so construed
as to exclude the right of the plaintiffs, who were under a duty to
make arrests, to the reward ; 2. That even if otherwise the deputies
might take the reward, they were incapacitated because of the general statute forbidding officers in any branch of the public service
from receiving any additional pay in any form whatever (Rev. Stat.
§ 1765), and because of the further provision that no civil officer
shall receive any compensation from the Treasury of the United
States beyond his salary (18 Stat. 85, io9).

The majority opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice
White. It was briefly as follows: The first contention of the
United States amounts to this, that although the Appropriation Act
vested entire discretion in the Attorney-General as to those whom
he would include in his offer of a reward, and although he exercised
his right by including all persons whether or not they were officers,
yet it is the duty of the court to read into the statute on the ground
of public policy, a qualification which it does not contain, that
employes of the Government are excluded from participating in the
-offered reward. This is to ask the judicial power to exert a discretion not vested in it, but lodged by the law-making power in a different branch of the Government. Further, the contention that it
is against public policy in all cases to enforce, in favor of a public
officer, a contract by which he claims to receive an offered reward
for doing his duty, is unwarnanted. It is only against public policy
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when the reward is offered by a private individual. But there is a
broad difference where the reward is expressly authorized by competent legislative authority. Further, by examining the past action
of Congress on similar occasions, it becomes clear that rewards have
often been allowed to public officers. As the Attorney-General chose
not to exclude in his offer deputy marshals, it is not necessary to
determine whether the plaintiffs are officers of the United States
within the meaning of the Statute cited. The Appropriation Act
being a special and later enactment operates necessarily to engraft
upon the prior and general statute an exception to the extent of the
power conferred on the Attorney-General and necessary for the
exercise of the discretion lodged in him for the purpose of carrying
out the later act. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown arrived at the same conclusion, but dissented
from the argument. Justices Harlan and Peckham dissented from
the conclusion on the ground that such a payment was contrary to
public policy and not authorized by the Appropriation Act.
The question presented by the principal case has often come
before the courts of the United States and of the separate states.
The decisions are not in perfect accord. One of the earliest cases
is Pool v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 219, decided in 1849. There
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a promise of a reward
offered by the Mayor of Boston for the detection of incendiaries
would not be enforced in favor of the plaintiff, a duly appointed
watchman, because there is no consideration for a contract to do
one's legal duty. The United States Supreme Court in Matthews
v. The United States, distinguishes that case from Poolv. Boston,
where the facts are practically the same, on the ground that while
the city had power to offer a reward, yet no legislative act had
*intrusted the municipal authorities with the discretion of including
in such an offer officers whose official duty it was to aid in the
detection of criminals. In Raiway Company v. Grafton, 51 Ark.
504 (1889), the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
recover a reward offered by the Railway Company for the apprehension of any one caught tampering with the railroad switches
during a strike. Plaintiffs were acting as a posse comitats under
the direct supervision of the sheriff when they made the arrests in
question, and the court decided that they could not be heard to
say that although under the direct command of the sheriff, they
had acted independently of him; and on the broad grounds of
public policy that a public officer, or those called to aid him,
cannot recover any extra reward for doing what is but their legal
duty, their claim was disallowed.
Spinney v. The United States and Lees v. Colgan are two cases
very close to the principal case. In the former, decided in 1897
(32 Ct. CL. 397), a postmaster, whose office had been robbed,
secured the conviction of the burglars and claimed the reward
offered by the Postmaster General under a Congressional Appropriation Act. The court held that the postmaster was a public
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officer; and on grounds of public policy should not be allowed
to receive rewards for doing his duty in securing the safety of
the mails. The court distinguished this case from Matthews v.
The United States on the ground -that there no duty devolved
by law upon the deputy marshals as such, while such a duty did
devolve upon the postmaster.
In conclusion let us note a case where the court came 'to the
opposite conclusion from that reached in Matthews v. The United
States. Lees v. Colan, 120 Cal. 262, decided in I898, is very
similar to the principal case which was decided only a year later.
Colgan was a captain of police in San Francisco. The Governor
of California, acting under a section of the penal code which
authorized the offering of rewards for the apprehension of ciminals, proclaimed a reward for the arrest of certain persons who
had committed a murder.
Colgan apprehended the men and
claimed the reward, which was refused on the ground that his
legal, duty required him to act as he had. The court, through
Garroutte, J., affirmed the judgment of the lower court on the
ground that it was against public policy to allow such a reward.
"No appellate court," said the learned judge, "has declared the
existence in principle of any well defined distinction as to public
officers, in cases where rewards have been offered by the state or
municipality, and where rewards have been offered by private parties." The statute did not specifically include peace officers, and
the implication cannot be made that it is meant to include such
persons when it has been declared a vicious public policy elsewhere.
To take such a step the interest must be plainly manifest.
On this subject see, also, Smith v. W'hildin, io Pa. 39; Davies
v. Burns, 5 Allen, 349; Pilie v. New Orleans, x9 La. Ann. 274;
.FEarris v. More, 70 Cal. 503; Harris v. Beaven, ixi Bush, 254.
These cases together with those noted above outline the trend of
judicial opinions in this country. As the matter has now come
before the Supreme Court, we may consider the question settled as
laid down in the majority opinion in Matthews v The United
States.

SURFACE WATERS; ADJOINING PROPERTIES ; RIGHT OF LOWER
FLOW FROM UPPER PROPERTY. In Lame

OWNER TO PREVENT THE

v. City of San Francisco, 57 Pac. 461 (May 31, x899), a property
owner in the city of San Francisco brought an action against the
city, averring in his complaint that he was the owner of land abutting
on a street; that the surface waters from his land had been accustomed
to drain into the street ; that the city raised the level of the street ;
and that, in col.sequence of such change of level, the surface waters
were backed up over plaintiff's land, causing damage. A denidrrer
to plaintiff's complaint was sustained by the Superior Court of C'alifornia, and, orn appeal to the Supreme Cotirt, the judgmen,f
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affirmed on the ground that plaintiff had no vested right to have an
outlet for his surface water over the adjoining street.
The right which plaintiff claimed in the above case falls within
that diversion of the law of Easements entitled "Natural Easements," or "Natural Servitudes." Mr. Addison says of them in
his work on Torts (p. 271) that they are "derived from the situation of places and are a natural and necessary adjunct to the property
to which they are annexed. . . . The right and burden of natural
servitudes are contemporaneous with the right of property itself."
Among these natural servitudes he mentions the servitude of surface
drainage from an upper property to a lower one, and he explains its
existence upon the ground that the upper land cannot be cultivated
or enjoyed unless the surface water is allowed to escape over the
lower.
The rule that the upper owner possesses the easement of surface
drainage was fully recognized by the Roman Law. In Martin v.
Riddle, 26 Pa. 415, Justice Lowrie said, "I shall now speak of the
general principles of the law in the matter of rain water and drainage, and of the respective rights and duties of adjoining proprietors
in relation thereto. . ..
Not readily finding the subject treated
of in any of our usual books of reference, I venture to extract the
law from books of a foreign origin.-Corp. Jur. Civ., 39, 3, z, and
43, 2- ; Code Nap. § 640; Pothier, du Voisinage;" the authorities
supporting the proposition that the servitude exists. Also in Kauffmann v. Greisemer, 26 Pa. 413, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

quotes Pardessus on the Civil Code to the same effect.
In America the civil law rule has found the greatest favor
among the agricultural states of the west, where the huge grain
fields would be utterly ruined, were the owners of the adjoining
properties at liberty to raise the surface of their ground without
providing for the escape of the water, converting the fields into
lakes whenever a heavy rain should fall. Thus in -Wharton v.
Stevens, 84 Iowa, 107, the Supreme Court of Iowa went so far as

to declare that, "It would be a bold counsel who would advocate,
and a bold court which would decide that water from rains and
falling snows, which are called by counsel, "surface water," when
it finds swales provided by nature to bear it away, may be arrested
in its natural course and made to flow back again upon the land
which these swales are intended to drain. The effect of such a
decision would be stupendous. It would subject millions of acres
of the best agricultural lands to destruction.

.

.

. This court is

not prepared to recognize a rule so detrimental to the interests of
the state and in conflict with sound legal principles and precedent."
See also Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583, and Gormlev v. Sandford,
52 Ill. 158, in which latter case the principles applicable to running

streams are held to govern the case of surface water. "As water
must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established where
land is held under artificial titles created by human laws, ther6 can
clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of application as that which enforces natural laws."
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On the other hand, several of the eastern courts have laid .down
what they term the "common law rule," to the effect that, as the
owner of property has the right to improve it as he sees fit, he cannot be prevented from raising its level, and the mere fact that
such change of level blocks the flow of surface water from an .upper
property and causes the water to collect on the latter affords no
right of action by the upper owner, but is damnum absque in/uria.
The leading authorities in .support of this proposition are Gannon
v. Hargadon, io Allen (Mass.), 1o 5 ; Barkley Y, Wilcox, 86 N. Y.
140; Bassett v. Salisbury Co., 43 N. H. 569; Bowlsby v. Spear,
3 N. J. L. 351 ; Washburn on Easements, 43;.

Although these cases have given the rule laid down by them the
name of the "common law rule," yet it is very uncertain whether
it is any more in accord with the principles of the common law
than the rule which recognizes the existence of the easement in
favor of the upper owner. Indeed in Gilham v. M. C.._R. .R., 49
Ill. 486, it was said that, "The doctrine of these cases (Gannon v.
argadon, supra, et al.) wholly ignores the most valued and
favored maxim of our law, Sic uere tuo ut alienum non laedas, a

maxim lying at the very foundation of good morals, and so preservative of the peace of society." See also Butlerv. Peck, 16 Ohio St.
363; Bellows v. Sackett, 15 Barb.

oi, and Boyd v. Conklin,

54 Mich. 583, in which cases the rule of the common law is declared
to be identical with that of the civil law and the use of the term,
"common law rule," as above indicated, is declared to be unfounded. Curiously enough, the question does not seem to have
been ever raised in England, but a writer in the American Law
Review does not hesitate to express his opinion that the English
courts will follow the rule of the civil law, preventing the lower
owner from obstructing the flow of the surface water: 23 Am. Law
Rev. 391. The same view is expressed in Wood on Nuisance,
§ 396, and 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 917, n.
Perhaps the fairest and most reasonable view to take of the subject has been adopted by those courts which make a compromise
between the civil law and common law rules. They say as regards
lands in the country, where improvements and changes of level
are comparatively infrequent, it is proper to allow the existence of
the easement over the lower property; but as regards town and
city lots, where changes and alterations are essential to their enjoyment, their owners may improve them as they see fit, and each man
must look after his own surface drainage. In support of this view
see Bentz v. Arrnstroi,-, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 40; Davidson v.
Sanders, i Pa. Super. Ct. 432; Clark v. Wilningon, 5 Har.
(Del.) 243; Wi/ers v. Bay View, 61 Wis. 642 ; Ccnetery v. Los
Angelos, 103 Cal. 467, and Lam..Ae v. San Francisco, supra. This

distinction commends itself to co'nmon sense and will probably be
the one adopted -by those states which are not yet bound by
decisions in favor of either of the so-called civil or common law
rules.
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NEGLIGENCE; JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE TORT-FEASOR NOT A BAR
In the case of Panenterv.

TO AN ACTION AGAINST THE OTHER.

Barstow, 47 At.

Io35 (1899), the plaintiff claimed damages for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants in cutting stone on the sidewalk, a piece of which struck her
in the eye. The defendants pleaded a former judgment against
Chace, a joint tort-feasor with the defendants, in the plaintiff's favor
for the same cause of action which was claimed in this suit. The
plaintiff demurred to this plea on the ground that the judgment
against Chace did not bar a recovery in this action.
The demurrer was sustained by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
The grounds upon which the court based its decision are best
stated by Stiness, J. "The only two American cases which directly
hold in favor of the bar of the former judgmeni are Hunt v. Bates,
7 R. I. Z17 (1862) and Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.),
355 (i8o8). The rule in this country is that joint tort-feasors may
be sued separately. Hunt v. Bates, and, indeed, the English cases
only hold the contrary in cases of trover and trespass. As to other
torts there is a practical unanimity. Virginia stands alone in holding the judgment to be a bar in all cases. This it did in Wilkes v.
Jackson, which was an assault case. That case has been recently
reviewed and affirmed in Petticolasv. City of Richmond, 95 Va.
456, 28 S. E. 566 (1897), which was trespass on the case for negligence. The court rests wholly on the ground of the English cases
and acquiescence for nearly a century in Wilkes v. Jackson. The
court further based its decision on the general rule and, sustaining
the demurrer, concluded its opinion with the statement that a judgment against one joint tort-feasor did not bar an action against
another joint tort-feasor.
- The English rule, as laid down in one of the best and latest cases
on the subject, Brensmead v. Harrison,L. R. C. P. 547 (1872),
is that a judgment in an action against one of several joint tortfeasors is a bar to an action against the others for the same cause,
although such judgment remains unsatisfied. See also Adams v.
Ham, 5 U. C. Q. B. 292 (1849), and Sloan v. Creasor, 26 U. C.
Q. B. 127 (1863).
This is also stated in the text books to be the English rule to-day;
see Webb's Pollack on Torts,,p. 231; Baylies' Addison on Torts
(6th Ed.), p. 94; Cooley on Torts, * page 138; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 388, 389, and Underhill's Summary of the Law of Torts,
p.

113, art.

35-

The American rule was first laid down by Chief Justice Kent. That
rule, which, as stated by the eminent jurist is generally followed in
the United States, is that the party injured may bring separate suits
against the wrong-doers and proceed to judgment in each case; and
that no bar arises as to any of them until satisfaction is received.
This is admitted to be the general rule in the United States, as
in the text books above cited and the cases to be cited, except in
Virginia, as pointed out by justice Stiness above.

NOTES.

711

Golding v. Hall, 9 Port. (Ala.) 169 (1839) ; Blann v. Cocheron,
Ala. 320 (1852) ; A/organ v. Chester, 4 Conn. 387 (1822),
approved in Ayer v. Ashmead, 3' Conn. 447 (1863) ; Union, Etc.,
Co. v. Sacklett, r9 Ills. App. 145 "(1886) ; Fleming v. MlacDonald, 5o Ind. 278 (1875); Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa," 310
2o

(1866) ; United Sc. v. Underwood, ii Bush. (Ky.) 265 (1875),
21 -Am. Rep. 214; I'Vhile v. Phillbrick, 5 Me. 147 (1827);
Aldrich v. Parnell, 147 Mass. 409 (1888) ; IXenyon v. Woodruff,
33 Mich. 310 (1876); Page v. .Freeman, 19 Mo. 421 (1854);
Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412 (885); White v. Lathrop,
2 0.
St. 33 (1825); Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S.
(Pa.) 103 (1841); Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 195
(1826) ; -4fcGehee v. Shafer, 15 Texas, 198 (1855) ; Gzfle v.
AfeClung, 5 W. Va. 131 (1872).

In Tennessee it is agreed that a judgment aga.inst one joint
wrong-doer is not of itself a bar to suits against the others, but it is
said that " the more reasonable doctrine on the other hand is, that
as each of the wrong-doers is liable for his own act, separate actions
may be brought at the same time or successfully, in each of which
the plaintiff may.proceed to judgment. But he claim or enforce
only one satisfaction:" Christianv. Hoover, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 5o5
(1834).

The Federal Courts follow the general rule laid down-by Chief
Justice Kent. The first case on the point under discussion is
Lovejoy v. Aurray, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 1 (1865), wherein it is held
that such a judgment (as the one spoken of in the case under discussion) against one joint tort-feasor is no bar to an action against
the other. "Nothing short of full satisfaction," said Miller, J.,
"or that which the law must consider as such can make such judgment a bar."
This case has been followed in. Sessions v. Johnson,
95 U. S. 347 (1877), and Birdsellv. Shaliol, 112 U. S. 4 8 5 , 489
(1884).
It is to be regretted that in Parmenterv. Barstow, nothing was
said as to the satisfaction of the prior judgment against Chace. In
England satisfaction was held to be not necessary in a judgment in
trover, because title was held to have passed by the mere rendering
of such judgment. This rule was extended, but wrongfully, as
Kent shows, to all cases of tort.
We are of opinion, then, that the present case goes too far in holding that a judgment against one of two joint tort-feasors does not
bar recovery in an action against the other. The court should
have inserted in its opinion the saving proviso in £ovejoy v. furray,
namely, that such judgment is a bar only where full satisfaction has
been recovered.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS; WHAT CONSTITUTFS ", DOING BusiNEss."
An interesting question as to the meaning-of the term
" business" within statutes regulating foreign corporations is dis-
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cussed in the case of Delaware and H. Canal Co. v. Mlahlenbrock
(N. J., 1899), 43 At. 978.
The plaintiff was a Pennsylvania corporation, in which state its
mines were situate, and its principal offices were in New York. The
coal for the price of which the suit was instituted was delivered to a
resident of New Jersey. The defence was that the plaintiff company was a foreign corporation which had not complied with the
New Jersey laws in its failure to file with the Secretary of State a
copy of its certificate of incorporation, and was therefore disabled
from suing in the state. The defence was based on a statute which
provided that "until such corporation so transacting business in
this state" shall have obtained from the Secretary of State a certificate authorizing it to do business, "itshall not maintain any
action in this state upon any contract made in this state."
The
court, after deciding that the case did not fall within the statute,
as the contract was made in New York, went on to discuss, obiter
dictum, how the section would apply if the contract had been made
in New Jersey. The conclusion reached is in accord with that
enunciated by most courts where analogous cases have arisen; and
declares, that the doing of a single act is not "transacting business" within the meaning of the act.
The provisions of statutes such as this are intended to affect
foreign corporations entering the domestic state by their agents
and engaging in the general prosecution of their ordinary business
therein: Knitting Co. v. Bronner (Sup.), 45 N. Y. Suppl. 714
(1897); Potterv.Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill, 8o (1843). To "transact business" means, according to the dictionaries, "to carry on,
or to prosecute that which occupies the time, attention and labor
of a man for the purpose of a livelihood or profit."
The term
must then comprise more than a single act unless there is an intent
to continue in the doing of those acts coupled with the necessary
preparation therefor: Abel v. State, io Ala. 631 (189o).
But
apart from the evidenced purpose to do more it may be stated as a
rule that "isolated transactions, commercial or otherwise, taking
place between a foreign corporation domiciled in one state and
citizens of another state, are not a doing or carrying on of business by the foreign corporation within the state :" 6 Thomp. Corp.
Sec. 7936.
Where the statutes prohibits the doing of any business in the
state, some courts follow the lead of Alabama and interpret them
as applying to a single act of business, if it be in the exercise of
a corporate function: larriorv. Security Co., 88 Ala. 275 (1889),
and Hacheny v. Leary, 12 Oregon, 40 (1885).
Though under a
similar statute the contrary was held in Gilchristv. Helene, H. S.
&' S. Rwy. Co., 47 Fed. 593 (E891)WITNESSES TO A WILL; THEIR IGNORANCE OF THE NATURE OF
THE DOCUMENT.
The case of the Missionary Society f the

~ethodist

Eiiscotpal Church v. Ey, Ohio, Oct. 3, 1899 (not yet
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reported), is an important and interesting case bearing upon the
requirements of law as to witnesses to the signature of a testator.
In this case Albert C. Ely died, leaving a will by .which the Missionary Society was made one of the beneficiaries. In the Probate
Court it was shown that the witnesses who acknowledged theif signatures did not know they were witnessing a will. The probate
judge, therefore, refused to admit it to probate, holding that the
law requires witnesses to know that it is a signature to a will which
they are witnessing. This decision wassustained- by.the lower court
and by the Supreme Court of the State.
In the case of IVite v. Trustees of British Afuseum, 6 Bing. 310
(1829), the court said: "The testator need not sign his name

in the presence of the witnesses, but a bare acknowledgment of
his handwriting is a sufficient signature to make their attestation
and subscription good within the statute, though such acknowledgment conveys no intimation whatever, or means of knowledge
either of the nature of the instrument or the object of the signing."
To the same effect are 9Wright and Wrz4ght, 7 Bing. 457 (183;) ;
Dewoer v. -Dewey, i Met. 349 (1840).

In Hogan v. Grosvenor,

lo Met. 56 (1845) the court said: "His acknowledgment that
the instrument is his, with a request that they attest it, is sufficient."
In the case of Broztn v. JfcAllister, 34 Ind. 375 (x87o), there
was no declaration by the testatrix, or any one else, as to whether
there was any writing on the paper other than the signature of the
testatrix, and no statement as to the object in requesting the witnesses to attest the signature. The court held that the statutory
requirements bad been complied with, and that the will should be
admitted to probate.
In a Vermont case-Robeits v. WFelch, 46 Vt. 164 (187 3 )-the

rule laid down is, that subscribing witnesses to a will must subscribe
as intending a testamentary execution; and hence they must know
the character of the act they are to perform, and that the instrument was a will. In Missouri, under an enactment which is nearly
a transcript of the Statute Charles II, it was held- Odenvaelder
v. Schorr, 8 Mo. App. 458 (x88o)-" that a subscribing witness
must know the instrument to be a last will, and must subscribe at
the testator's request."
The New York and New Jersey statutes expressly provide that
the testator shall declare the paper to be his last will and testament.

